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The Cuban Invasion—II

Rebels' Defeat Is Ascribed to Errors In Plan and Execution in Washington

CPYRGHT

BY HANSON W. BALDWIN

THE invasion of Cuba last tellience Agency. The agency

The small invading force was adjudged shortly before the operation, in a written report submitted by a Colonel Hawking of the Marine Corps, to be "battleworthy" and comparatively almost as well equipped as the regular forces of Cuba. The report was submitted to the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, and to the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and was approved by them. It was also submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, his director, and Richard M. Bissell, the deputy, for planning and operations and it was in charge of the Cuban situation. It probably bears the signature of the author, by resigning from the service.

News Analysis
was borne fighting.
as a similar United States unit. This judgment had some effect in Washington and observers contend, out by the actual fighting.

Program of Joint Chiefs
The Joint Chiefs of Staff made mistakes in failing to be compact and emphatic in presenting the table enough and in failing to commit all their ideas and viewpoints to paper.

Despite the casualty statistics (some 1,200 of the 1,500 to 1,600 captured), the invaders gave a good account of themselves. Most sources agree that the refugees fought well until their ammunition ran out, that they inflicted more casualties on Fidel Castro's forces than he had conceded, and that the Cuban militia in the area of the landing almost immediately defected in scores to the invaders' side only to defect back again to Dr. Castro after the failure of the invasion became obvious.

(In the interests of secrecy much of the Cuban planning and execution was oral.)

The White House believes the military segments were faulty and the students inadequate, but Flanagan scored very high.

The State Department, the other adviser best responsible for coordinating all resources and effort, by insisting upon legalisms that the gravity consciousness of a democracy so often demands when it resorts to naked force.

Like the British and French invasion of Port Said during the Suez crisis of 1956, the Cuban operational plan and their implementation failed to take into account the potential resistance, share, and maneuverability of George Bush, a presidential candidate, shares, and maneuverability. He has accepted blame for insufficiently emphasizing to the President the dangerous

opposition that accrued to failure, and all the psychological and political disadvantages associated with the term "Yankee imperialism." And our backing of the Cuban refugees was so thinly disguised that it immediately exposed Washington to the same charges we would have faced had United States armed forces been employed.

The second great lesson of Cuba is the importance of tight policy, control, direction and management of any venture.

involving the application of military power, no matter how small. This control and management must center in the President as Commander in Chief, though President will use the machinery of government differently, but history has shown that ordered discussions and debates and staff work and recorded decisions may bring new insight and prevent major mistakes. These procedures were largely lacking in the Kennedy Administration prior to the time of the Cuban invasion.

SECRET **REF ID: A65042110**
of the C.I.A.

A third lesson of Cuba is that no military or paramilitary operation should be under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is of such a low and shameful that it is bound to become overt by open rather than covert or secret. Operations of the size of the Cuban Invasion should be managed by the Defense Department, which is far better staffed and has more expert military knowledge than the C.I.A.

Another lesson is the necessity of keeping all secret intelligence activities and operations

the constant top-notch performance and review. Machinery

and they had always made mistakes, but the principles they believed in differed from military application to the same military process. The right of dissent, collective wisdom as opposed to the judgment of a single military man, was fundamental in the structure of those who have been in the

In sum, the failure of Cuba
was a failure of bureaucracy.
In its failures it was
essentially a failure of men
rather than of organization.

President Admiral A. E. Eccles,
and arguments in "Notes on
Colonial Crimes," a paper pre-
pared under the sponsorship of
the Washington University
Institute Research Project.
The new or other more
complete divorce
policy and
is allotted to the task
of the project that "in great
partitive, the President,
and agreed to have
an analysis of
the general unity
of the country up to his
time, and the price of full
and complete separation is

the original species between which can venture eight or nine feet in width; provided that with the total length of the lateral, the lateral of the main channel is determined by the water level undividedly, and the water has no substantial power other than by tech-